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In the past one hundred years, a series of international cases have
addressed the group or unity principle in the context of territorial
allocation. This article provides an analysis of such jurisprudence, and
concludes that this principle can act as a mediating principle to in-
form the interpretation and application of the primary rules relating
to territorial acquisition, thus raising a presumption about the extent
and scope of an established territorial title. By showing respect for
the natural link between land territories that form an integral group
or unity, this principle might provide an efficient and pragmatic
approach to settling territorial disputes.
I. Introduction
1. Under the principle of “la terre domine la mer” or “the land dominates the
sea”, there is little doubt that a State cannot base its territorial claims to land
areas merely on the fact that such land areas are located within its territorial
sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf.1 However, there is
no ground for us to say absolutely that the geographical proximity or contigu-
ity does not influence the allocation of territorial sovereignty at all. Scholarly
* PhD-candidate at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies of Leiden
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1 Brian Murphy, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law, 1
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal (1995), 199-200.
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discussions on the relationship between geographical proximity and territorial
sovereignty date back to 1884 when Jan Ferguson observed: “The occupation
of any terra firma is taken to include the presumption of possession of its
adjacent unoccupied islands.”2 In other words, when a State occupies a land
adjacent to another unoccupied land, the adjacency can lead to a presumption
that these land areas form a single group or physical unit that share the same
legal destiny and are subject to the same sovereignty. In Eritrea and Yemen,
Yemen has termed it “the principle of natural or geophysical unity”, which is
also called the group or unity principle in this article.3
2. In the past one hundred years, a series of international cases have
addressed the group or unity principle in the context of territorial allocation.
This paper provides an analysis of such jurisprudence. Part II maps all relevant
international jurisprudence in chronological order. On this basis, Part III
further analyzes the salient features of this principle. Part IV concludes the dis-
cussion by drawing attention to the practical implications of this principle
on the settlement of territorial disputes. To avoid any doubt, the group or
unity principle discussed in this article, which pertains to the acquisition of
sovereignty over land territories, should be distinguished from the matter of
enclosing a group of islands with a system of archipelagic or straight baselines
for the assertion of maritime entitlements.4
II. International jurisprudence
II.A. The 1904 Guiana Boundary case
3. The 1904 Guiana Boundary case for the first time articulated the group or
unity principle, which relates to the acquisition of land territories as a single
group or physical unit. In that case, the arbitrator, Victor-Emmanuel III,
King of Italy, held that “the effective possession of a part of a region” might
“be held to confer a right to the acquisition of the sovereignty of the whole of
a region which constituted a single organic whole”.5
2 Jan Helenus Ferguson, Manual of International Law, for the Use of Navies,
Colonies and Consulates (1884), 100.
3 Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea and Yemen), RIAA Vol.
XXII, Award of 9 October 1998, 314, para.460.
4 For an illustration of discussions about the latter, see The South China Sea
Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),
Award of 12 July 2016, 236-237, paras.573-576.
5 The Guiana Boundary case (Brazil, Great Britain), RIAA Vol. XI, Award of 6 June
1904, 21.
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4. Though in the end, that case does not apply this principle to the territory
in dispute because of its failure to be deemed a single organic whole de facto
owing to its size or physical configuration, a series of subsequent international
jurisprudence, which will be discussed in turn below, has endorsed, to some
extent, this group or unity principle.6 These cases include the 1928 Island of
Palmas case (arbitration), the 1933 Eastern Greenland case (PCIJ), the 1953
Minquiers and Ecrehos case (ICJ), the 1998 Eritrea and Yemen case (arbitra-
tion), the 2008 Malaysia v. Singapore case (ICJ) and the 2012 Nicaragua v.
Colombia case (ICJ).
II.B.The 1928 Island of Palmas case
5. The arbitrator, Max Huber, stated in the 1928 Island of Palmas case that
“in the exercise of territorial sovereignty there are necessarily gaps, intermit-
tence in time and discontinuity in space”. On this basis, he concluded that
the group of adjacent islands was possible to be treated as in law a unity and
that “the fate of the principal part may involve the rest”.7
6. Though admitting the influence of the adjacency on territorial acquisi-
tion, Huber held that the group or unity principle was not admissible as a le-
gal method of deciding questions on territorial sovereignty because it lacked
precision and its application would lead to arbitrary results. This holding
draws a clear distinction between the group or unity principle and modes of
territorial acquisition such as discovery of terra nullius, effectivités, historic title
and cession. As discussed below, several subsequent cases have endorsed and
elaborated this distinction.
II.C. The 1933 Eastern Greenland case
7. The foregoing considerations in Island of Palmas certainly played some
part, even if only implicitly, in the 1933 Eastern Greenland case. In the latter
case, Norway argued that the fact that Denmark might have exercised sover-
eignty along the west coast of Greenland could not lead to the conclusion
that the territorial sovereignty could be extended to Eastern Greenland.8
6 Ibid., 21-22.
7 The Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, USA), RIAA Vol. II, Award of 4 April
1928, 854-855.
8 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), PCIJ, Series A/B, No.53
(1933), 30, 49.
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The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) did not uphold
Norway’s claim.9
8. Humphrey Waldock observed that the PCIJ’s rejection was not merely
because of Eastern Greenland “being a continuation of other territory pos-
sessed by Denmark”, nor Greenland being “a geographical unity” as an is-
land.10 Viewing the geographical unity of Greenland as an important fact in
assessing the limits of Denmark’s State activity, Waldock was of the view that
“[t]he Court held Denmark to have actually displayed state authority in regard
to the whole of Greenland, slight though the impact of that authority might
have been in the contested part of the island”.11 In Gerald Fitzmaurice’s opin-
ion, the word “actually” used by Waldock meant that “contiguity did not con-
fer upon Denmark a merely constructive or notional possession: the possession
was actual, but presumed”.12 (Emphasis in the original.) Moreover, by using
the word “presumed”, Fitzmaurice meant that contiguity or proximity pro-
duced a presumed result that Denmark’s display of State activities was related
to the territory as a whole, and that the onus was on Norway to rebut this pre-
sumption.13 Put differently, contiguity or proximity could raise a presump-
tion of intent and ability to control the outlying areas or to treat both the
occupied and outlying areas as a single group or physical unit for territorial
acquisition.
II.D. The 1953 Minquiers and Ecrehos case
9. The 1953 Minquiers and Ecrehos case is another example of the implicit ap-
plication of the group or unity principle. Fitzmaurice commented that the
judgment of this case made it gradually apparent that “the disputed groups
[Minquiers and Ecrehos] were part of an entity (the Channel Islands) over
which as a whole English sovereignty had indisputably (and undisputedly)
existed for centuries”.14 (Emphasis in the original.)
9 Ibid., 73.
10 Humphrey Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies,
25 BYBIL (1948), 343-344.
11 Ibid., 344 (emphasis added).
12 Gerald Fitzmaurice, Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-
4: Points of Substantive Law, Part II, 32 BYBIL (1955-56), 74.
13 Ibid., 74.
14 Ibid., 75.
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10. As Judge Levi Carneiro stated in his individual opinion, “the Minquiers
and the Ecrehos are closer to Jersey than the mainland. They must be
regarded as attached to Jersey rather than to the mainland. They must be in-
cluded in the archipelago. These islets were, and continue to be, part of its
‘natural unity’. It is for this reason that they remained English as the archipel-
ago itself.”15 Judge Levi Carneiro further concluded that it would seem incon-
ceivable that “England, having an important interest in the Channel Islands
and full domination over the sea, and possessing all the principal islands,
should not, without some special reason, have conquered and retained the
Minquiers and Ecrehos”.16
11. Fitzmaurice viewed Judge Levi Carneiro’s above statement as a clear
illustration of the principle that “sovereignty, once shown to exist in respect of
an entity or a natural unity as a whole, may be deemed, in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, to extend to all parts of that entity or unity”.17
(Emphasis in the original.)
II.E. The 1998 Eritrea and Yemen case
12. Another case of relevance is the 1998 Eritrea and Yemen case. In that case,
Yemen claimed that its territorial sovereignty over the Hanish Group should
encompass the entire island chain, including the Mohabbakahs and the
Haycocks, based on what it called “the principle of natural or geophysical
unity”.18 The tribunal commented on this principle, stating:
the authorities speak of “entity” or “natural unity” in terms of a pre-
sumption or of probability and moreover couple it with proximity,
contiguity, continuity, and such notions, well known in international
law as not in themselves creative of title, but rather of a possibility or pre-
sumption for extending to the area in question an existing title already
established in another, but proximate or contiguous, part of the same
“unity”.19
15 Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v. United Kingdom), Individual Opinion of Judge
Levi Carneiro, ICJ Reports 1953, 102, para.14.
16 Ibid., 102, para.15.
17 Gerald Fitzmaurice, above n.12, 75.
18 Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea and Yemen), above n.3,
314, para.460.
19 Ibid., 315, para.462.
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13. The tribunal agreed that the group or unity principle applied to both
islands and the mainland. The tribunal held that there was a “twofold possible
application” in this case, whether as Yemen would assert, it might be “applied
to cause governmental display on one island of a group to extend in its juridi-
cal effect to another island or islands in the same group”, or following the
same logic, “the mainland coasts should be considered to continue to some
islands or islets off that coast which were naturally ‘proximate’ to the coast or
‘appurtenant’ to it”.20
14. The tribunal underlined that in either of the two scenarios, “these
notions of unity and the like are never in themselves roots of title, but rather
may in certain circumstances raise a presumption about the extent and scope
of a title otherwise established”.21 In other words, the group or unity principle
should not be regarded as the roots of a title but instead serve as a presump-
tion about the extent and scope of an established title and might be rebutted
by other fully established evidence to the contrary.
15. In particular, Eritrea and Yemen disputed the territorial sovereignty over
the Mohabbakah Islands, which consisted of the following four small islands:
They are Sayal Islet, which is no more than 6 nautical miles from the
nearest point on the Eritrean mainland coast, Harbi Islet and Flat Islet;
all three of these are within twelve nautical miles of the mainland coast.
Finally, there is High Islet, which is less than one nautical mile outside
the twelve-mile limit from the mainland coast, and about five nautical
miles from the nearest Haycock islands, namely South West Haycock.22
16. Eritrea argued for the so-called “leapfrogging method”, which relied on
the undoubted rule that the territorial sea extended to 12 nautical miles (M)
not just from the mainland coast but also from the baseline of islands, to claim
that any islands within a 12 M belt of the territorial sea should be deemed un-
der the same sovereignty as the mainland or island nearby.23 Accordingly,
Eritrea claimed that an entire chain or group of islands should be placed under
one State’s sovereignty provided that no gap existed between the islands of
more than 12 M measured from their respective baselines.24
20 Ibid., 315, para.463.
21 Ibid., 315, para.464.
22 Ibid., 316, para.467.
23 Ibid., 317, para.473.
24 Ibid.
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17. In this regard, the tribunal admitted that there was “a strong presump-
tion that islands within the twelve-mile coastal belt will belong to the coastal
State unless there is a fully-established case to the contrary”.25 The tribunal
further held that the sovereignty over islands undoubtedly could generate a
right to a corresponding territorial sea and that, though the extended territo-
rial sea “cannot of itself generate sovereignty over islands so encompassed”, it
could result in “a presumption, capable of being rebutted by evidence of a su-
perior title”.26 In the circumstances of this case, the tribunal concluded that
all the islands of the Mohabbakah islands were subject to the territorial sover-
eignty of Eritrea since all of them except one (High Islet) were within the 12
M territorial sea measured from the mainland of Eritrea.27
18. High Islet was barely more than 12 M (i.e. 12.72 M) from the territo-
rial sea baseline along the mainland coast of Eritrea. The tribunal held that
High Islet was subject to the territorial sovereignty of Eritrea on the ground
that it was part of the Mohabbakah islands.28 This finding was based on the
group or unity principle, which, according to the tribunal, “might find a mod-
est and suitable place” in this case.29 The reason leading the tribunal to decide
in this way was that historical records showed that the Mohabbakah Islands
had “always been considered as one group”.30
19. This decision, in fact, reveals two elements of significant relevance to the
application of the group or unity principle: first, the land territory in question
should be adjacent to the other territory of a State; and second, historical
records indicate that the State concerned has always considered the land terri-
tory in question as part of a single group or physical unit of territories under its
sovereignty. Some scholars commented that this decision arguably attributed
great juridical weight to geographical considerations of contiguity or adjacency
in the case of acquiring territorial sovereignty over uninhabited islands.31
20. Yet, the relationship between these two elements remains unclear. The
tribunal did not address this matter because in the circumstances of this case,
25 Ibid., 317, para.474.
26 Ibid.




31 See, e.g., Constance Johnson, Case Analysis: Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, 13 Leiden
JIL (2000), 446; Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration:
First Stage—The Law of Title to Territory Re-Averred, 48 ICLQ (1999), 385.
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both elements are fulfilled. However, one may doubt whether these two ele-
ments are cumulative or alternative requirements in order for applying the
group or unity principle. A subsequent case, namely the 2012 Nicaragua v.
Colombia case (see Section II.G, below), has touched upon this matter.
II.F. The 2008 Malaysia v. Singapore case
21. The group or unity principle was further addressed in the 2008 Malaysia
v. Singapore case.32 Malaysia and Singapore each claimed a territorial title to
Middle Rocks, which comprised some rocks that were permanently above wa-
ter, standing 0.6-1.2 meters high, and were located at 0.6 M from Pedra
Branca (or Pulau Batu Puteh) and 8 M from the Malaysian mainland coast.33
Singapore based its territorial claim to Middle Rocks on the ground that they
were dependencies of the island of Pedra Branca and formed geographically
and morphologically with the latter a single group of maritime features.34 To
this effect, Singapore claimed to treat Pedra Branca (the main island) and
Middle Rocks as a group or single physical unit of maritime features to be
subject to the same sovereignty.35
22. The ICJ did not explicitly comment on the group or unity principle
asserted by Singapore. Instead, the ICJ considered that “Middle Rocks should
be understood to have had the same legal status as Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu
Puteh as far as the ancient original title held by the Sultan of Johor was
concerned”.36
23. The ICJ further concluded that Malaysia lost its territorial title over
Pedra Branca at a later stage, as it failed to protest against Singapore’s effective
control over the island.37 However, the ICJ concluded that the particular cir-
cumstances causing the passing of title to Pedra Branca to Singapore did not
32 It is noted that in this case, Singapore claimed to treat three maritime features—
Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge—as a group or single physical unit
to be subject to the same sovereignty. However, the ICJ considered that South
Ledge was distinct from Middle Rocks by being a low-tide elevation. Thus, in con-
trast with Middle Rocks, the ICJ did not conclude that South Ledge should have
the same legal fate as Pedra Branca. See Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment of 23 May
2008, ICJ Reports 2008, 99, 100-101, paras.291, 296.
33 Ibid., 96, para.278.
34 Ibid., 96-97, para.279.
35 Ibid., 97, para.282.
36 Ibid., 99, para.290.
37 Ibid., 96, para.276.
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apply to Middle Rocks, and thus, the original or historic title over Middle
Rocks remained with Malaysia.38
II.G. The 2012 Nicaragua v. Colombia case
24. In Nicaragua v. Colombia, the parties disagreed on sovereignty over the
islands of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina and the appurtenant
islets and cays.39 Article I of the 1928 Treaty, to which both Nicaragua and
Colombia were parties, stipulated that Colombia had sovereignty over “San
Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and over the other islands, islets and
reefs forming part of the San Andrés Archipelago”.40The term “archipelago”
means a group of islands.41 Hence, ascertaining what constituted “part of the
San Andrés Archipelago” amounts to determining which maritime features
could form a group with “the islands of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa
Catalina” to be under Colombia’s sovereignty.
25. The ICJ first employed the proximity test and concluded that Article I
could be understood as including at least the maritime features closest to the
islands of “San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina”, which were the
Alburquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays lying 20 and 16 M, respectively,
from San Andrés island.42 By contrast, given considerations of distance, the
ICJ held that Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo, being the most remote features by
lying 165 and 205 M from Providencia, were “less likely” to form part of the
Archipelago.43 Nevertheless, the term “less likely” indicates that the ICJ is not
sure about the answer.
26. In fact, the ICJ admitted that the geographical location of the contested
maritime features alone could not provide a definitive answer to the question
about the composition of the Archipelago.44 Moreover, the ICJ went further
to say that neither could the historical records referred to by the parties in this
case suffice to clarify the composition of the Archipelago, as such historical
38 Ibid., 99, para.289.
39 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19
November 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 633-637, paras.16-17.
40 Ibid., 646, para.42.
41 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Definition of Archipelago” (www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/archipelago).
42 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), above n.39, 649,
para.53.
43 Ibid., 647, 649, paras.43, 53.
44 Ibid., 649, para.53.
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records failed to specifically indicate which features were considered by the
parties to form part of that Archipelago.45 In the ICJ’s own words:
the question about the composition of the Archipelago cannot, in the
view of the Court, be definitively answered solely on the basis of the geo-
graphical location of the maritime features in dispute or on the historical
records relating to the composition of the San Andrés Archipelago re-
ferred to by the Parties, since this material does not sufficiently clarify
the matter.46 [Emphasis added.]
27. The words “solely” and “or” infer that at least in the circumstances of this
case, neither of the two elements—“the geographical location of the maritime
features in dispute” and “the historical records relating to the composition of
the San Andrés Archipelago referred to by the Parties”—suffices for the pur-
poses of determining the composition of a group or unity.
28. Consequently, the ICJ shifted its focus from the composition of the
Archipelago to examining those arguments and evidence submitted by the
parties in support of their respective claims to sovereignty that were not based
on the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty.47 In the end,
the ICJ concluded that Colombia enjoyed sovereignty over all the disputed
maritime features based on effectivités because it had acted à titre de souverain
in respect of these features.48
29. It is noted that the president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, com-
mented on this judgment that:
Inexplicably—after recognizing the sovereignty of Colombia over the en-
tire Archipelago and claiming that it, as a unit, generated continental
shelf rights and exclusive economic zone—the Court adjusted the delim-
itation line, leaving the keys of Serrana, Serranilla, Quitasue~no and Bajo
Nuevo separated from the rest of the Archipelago.49 [Spanish in the
original.]
45 Ibid., 649, paras.53, 55.
46 Ibid., 649, para.53.
47 Ibid., 649, para.56.
48 Ibid., 655, 657, paras.81, 84.
49 Translated into English by the author. For the original text, see Alocución del
Presidente Juan Manuel Santos sobre el fallo de la Corte Internacional de Justicia,
19 Nov. 2012 (www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/2012-11-19/4661).
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30. His comment infers that the ICJ treats the entire Archipelago as an in-
tegrated unit for acquiring both territorial sovereignty over the features and
maritime entitlements around the features. However, he might misread the
ICJ judgment.
31. The fact that the ICJ has allocated all the disputed maritime features to
Colombia does not mean that the ICJ treats all these features as constituting
the Archipelago, or said differently, a group or unity of the same legal fate.
Rather, the ICJ has undertaken individual examinations about whether
Colombia had acted à titre de souverain “specifically in relation to” each dis-
puted feature, noting that:
although the majority of the acts à titre de souverain referred to by
Colombia were exercised in the maritime area which encompasses all the
disputed features, a number of them were undertaken specifically in rela-
tion to the maritime features in dispute.50 [Emphasis added.]
32. In sum, though the ICJ did not decide what should, in borderline cases,
constitute the Archipelago or a group or unity of maritime features, its reason-
ing in this case entails several implications. First, the test of proximity or adja-
cency is of relevance to a certain extent, regarding what features should form
part of a group or unity, but this test alone cannot provide a definitive answer,
since it remains unclear whether a group or unity should encompass the re-
mote maritime features or not. Second, historical records that specifically indi-
cate which features have been considered by the parties to form part of a
group or unity would play a role in clarifying the composition of that group
or unity.
III. Analysis of salient features
33. The foregoing analysis of relevant international jurisprudence unveils sev-
eral salient features of the group or unity principle. The first one pertains to
the distinction between this principle and modes of territorial acquisition.
The second concerns the legal status of this principle. The third one relates to
two elements for the application of this principle.
34. First, the group or unity principle should be distinguished from modes
of territorial acquisition, namely primary rules relating to the acquisition of
50 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), above n.39, 655,
para.81.
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territorial sovereignty, including but not limited to discovery of terra nullius,
effectivités, historic title and cession. Accordingly, this principle should not be
regarded as the roots of a title. Instead, it serves as a presumption about the
extent and scope of an established title and may be rebutted by other fully
established evidence to the contrary.
35. Second, concerning its legal status, the group or unity principle might
be taken into account as a general principle within the meaning of Article
38(1) of the ICJ Statute when interpreting or applying the primary rules relat-
ing to territorial acquisition.51 It is widely accepted that “general principles”
under Article 38(1), though only referring to “general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations” as derived from national legal systems, also encap-
sulates “general principles derived from international law”.52 General
principles of the latter kind can exert influence on the interpretation, applica-
tion and development of other rules of international law.53 Some scholars also
called general principles of such kind “mediating principles”, as they act upon
“other rules and principles”.54 The term “mediating principles” is defined
as “a legal concept exercising a kind of interstitial normativity, pushing and
pulling the boundaries of true primary norms when they threaten to overlap
or conflict with each other”.55
36. Mediating principles can be seen as “relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties” under Article 31(3)(c) of the
51 The precautionary principle is of a similar legal status under current international
law. Though whether this principle is a valid and binding rule of international law
remains disputable, it has been widely recognized as a general principle of interna-
tional environmental law and can be taken into account when interpreting relevant
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
For discussions about the legal status of this principle, see Southern Bluefin Tuna
Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), ITLOS Case Nos. 3 and 4
(1999), Provisional Measures, Separate opinion of Judge Treves, 317-319, paras.8-
11; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April
2010, ICJ Reports 2010, 71, para.164.
52 See James Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: a Study in the Development of
International Law (2011), 219. Also see Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The
Making of International Law (2007), 224.
53 Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, above n.52, 224.
54 See Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments, in:
Alan Boyle and David Feestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (2001), 31. Also see Alan
Boyle & Christine Chinkin, above n.52, 224.
55 Ibid.
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to be taken into account in the
interpretation of other primary rules of international law.56 Arguably, the
group or unity principle, which is endorsed by various international jurispru-
dence, can act as a mediating principle to inform the interpretation and appli-
cation of the primary rules relating to territorial acquisition, thus raising a
presumption about the extent and scope of an established territorial title.
37. Third, two elements are of relevance to determine whether certain land
territories constitute a single group or physical unit for territorial acquisition:
(1) the land territory in question should be adjacent to the other territory of
a State; and (2) historical records show that the State concerned has always
considered the land territory in question as part of a single group or physical
unit of territories under its sovereignty.
38. Concerning the relationship between these two elements, it is clear that
the first element—the test of proximity or adjacency—alone cannot provide a
definitive answer to the composition of a group or unity. However, whether
the above two elements are cumulative or alternative requirements in order
for applying the group or unity principle remains to be seen.
IV. Conclusion
39. The above analysis of relevant international jurisprudence leads to the
conclusion that the group or unity principle can act as a mediating principle
to inform the interpretation and application of the primary rules relating to
territorial acquisition, thus raising a presumption about the extent and scope
of an established territorial title.
40. In practice, this principle might provide an efficient and pragmatic ap-
proach for settling territorial disputes, especially those concerning maritime
features. By showing respect for the natural link between land territories that
form an integral group or unity, this principle not only avoids volumes of
work including identifying the legal status of each land territory individually
but also prevents further conflicts arising from the potential co-existence of
several sovereign powers within a relatively narrow and adjoining area.
Consequently, the application of this principle might significantly contribute
to achieving the ultimate peace in disputed areas.
56 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with re-
spect to Activities in the Area, ITLOS Case No.17 (2011), Advisory Opinion of
Seabed Disputes Chamber, 47, para.135.
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41. Yet, the application of this principle is not without limits. For a State to
avail this principle in territorial acquisition, other States must not have estab-
lished a title to the territory in question. Otherwise, such an established title
would be regarded as evidence to the contrary to have the effect of rebutting
the presumption raised by the group or unity principle. This precondition
acts as a safeguard to prevent States from abusing this principle.






/chinesejil/article-abstract/18/1/165/5479577 by guest on 20 M
arch 2020
